Catalan independence, five years on
Image: Victorgrigas via Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA-4.0
‘Arribats en aquest moment històric, i com a president de la Generalitat, assumeixo en presentar-los els resultats del referèndum davant del Parlament i dels nostres conciutadans, el mandat que Catalunya esdevingui un estat independent en forma de república.’
'Arriving at this historic moment, and as president of the Generalitat, I present the results of the referendum to the Parliament and our fellow citizens, the mandate that Catalonia becomes an independent state in the form of a republic.'
- Carles Puigdemont, 130è JxCat President de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 10 October 2017
And with that simple utterance, the latest republic in Europe, La República Catalana, was born. After a referendum on the 1st of October 2017 in which 92% of voters voted to split from the rest of Spain, La República Catalana looked to become Western Europe’s latest republic. However, a mere few seconds later, this fledgling nation-state disappeared off the map of Europe; much to the surprise of Catalans assembled at the Passeig de Lluis Companys who had welcomed its birth with thunderous applause. This October marked five years since the referendum, but La República Catalana is yet to appear on any map. Instead, we have seen Israeli spyware, continuous pro-independence majorities in the Catalan parliament, and three deposed presidents; 5 years on, where is Catalonia now?
Where is Catalonia now and how did it end up here?
In the aftermath of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and its rapid suspension, Catalonian Deputies voted to ratify the document 17 days later and, on the same day, the Madrid government quickly implemented direct rule in Catalonia via Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, removing Puigdemont and his government from their positions. Puigdemont would later announce his move to Brussels and his former ministers would be arrested for the crimes of embezzlement, rebellion, and sedition. Puigdemont remains in exile after being released by German authorities; his ministers were sentenced by the Spanish Supreme Court. While some argue that he has been persecuted for having led a democratic referendum, declared illegal by Spanish authorities, others argue that his actions stemmed from ideological motivations; even at the height of the crisis in October 2017, a survey by the Catalan government statistical agency Centre d’Estudis d’Opinó found that 48.7% of Catalans supported independence, while 43.6% did not.
In the aftermath of the 2017 independence declaration and the invoking of Article 155, the handpicked successor of Puigdemont, Quim Torra, was elected president of the Generalitat de Catalunya. He had a long history of anti-Spanish (anti-Castilian) sentiment with tweets stating: ‘Vergüenza es una palabra que los españoles hace años que han eliminado de su vocabulario’ (‘Shame is a word that the Spanish removed from their vocabulary a long time ago’) and ‘Los españoles solo saben expoliar’ (‘Spaniards only know how to pillage’).
He was later disqualified from public office for a year and a half, which led to Pere Aragonès of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) assuming the office of president of the Generalitat, first as interim and later the 131st president. Aragonès’ position as president was cemented with a delicate coalition between ERC and the JxCat (Junts per Catalunya) after the 2021 Catalan regional elections in which pro-independence parties took more than 50% of the vote with 74 deputies, an increase of four; only two deputies fewer than Artur Mas, who was the president during the early stages of the 2010s independence movement and undertook the first 2014 ‘consultative’ referendum.
Nevertheless, in a break from the more dramatic methods of Puigdemont and the 2017 movement, Pere Aragonès has taken to a roadmap of discussion and negotiation with the Spanish Government, toning down the rhetoric of his predecessors. The removal of Rajoy as Prime Minister of Spain and his centre-left replacement, Pedro Sánchez, have helped to calm tensions between Madrid and the Catalan government and further give Aragonès’ pragmatic approach more viability. Sánchez has had a more conciliatory approach and even pardoned those seen as ringleaders of the 2017 secession attempt: critical in easing tensions between the national and regional governments. However, he has also ruled out a referendum and stressed that any negotiations will have to adhere to the constitution; warning he would apply Article 155 if necessary. While the pardons have increased the credibility of the joint talks in the eyes of the ERC, their target is a referendum, surpassing all the red lines of Madrid.
Moreover, alleged discoveries of Israeli Pegasus spyware on the devices of high-profile Catalan politicians like Aragonès, Puigdemont and Artur Mas, as well as the ERC Speaker of the Catalan parliament, have led to divisions within the independence movement over Aragonès’ pragmatic path and criticism from his hard-line right-wing JxCat coalition partner.
A fledgling independence movement?
The independence movement is a patchwork Senyera of independence parties of typically opposing ideologies: left-wing ERC and CUP (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) and right-wing JxCat. As the independence process stalls, these differences in ideology and approaches have led to infighting between these coalition partners. On 8 October 2022, JxCat quit Aragonès’ coalition after their vice president was fired, following revelations of an attempted vote of no confidence. These divisions and perceived lack of direction have created a despondency amongst Catalans; a recent study by Centre d’Estudis d’Opinó found only 42% support independence, with 50% opposed.
As with many national movements, the 2017 movement arose from popular anger and resentment towards the Madrid government’s politics of austerity. Many people from the working class saw independence as a way to achieve a break from austerity politics. The Catalan business elites saw Catalonia being dragged behind by the weak performance of the wider Spanish economy – a sentiment amongst the Catalan elites that stretches back to the 19th century. The 2017 independence movement was full of hope, as people from all backgrounds saw what they wanted within the dream of an independent Catalonia. In reaction to the 2017 unilateral declaration of independence, the EU stated that Catalonia would find itself outside of the Union and single market. Witnessing the ongoing troubles with Brexit and fears of a similar economic mess, both Catalan business elites and working-class people have scaled back their support for such unilateral action and placed their hopes in a negotiated settlement with the Spanish state for more autonomy, or even an internationally backed referendum that would solve issues with the EU.
Where do Catalonia and Spain go from here?
Catalonia is one of the most dynamic and cosmopolitan regions of Spain, making it an attractive place for migration both national and international; in fact, roughly 15% of the population today are non-citizens.
So, for the Catalan independence movement, any future mobilisation towards independence will require the mobilisation of this segment of Catalan society as well as the mobilisation of Spanish citizens from other regions. The issue with nationalism, both left and right-wing, is that at times it can breed newer nationalisms. With the entry of the Spanish ultranationalist, anti-Catalan Vox party to the Catalan parliament, we see that simply using nationalist concepts without offering a vision of the future or material solutions has alienated non-Catalan speakers, leading them to the far right. Catalan nationalism can and must offer a more human alternative to the limited conceptions of citizenship and belonging of other nations, beyond linguistic nationalism. With youth unemployment of 38% in Catalonia, independentistas will have to show how the average person in Catalonia, regardless of linguistic background, will benefit materially from Catalan independence to mobilise all segments of society.
While sedition law reform and discussions about further autonomy may placate the Catalan political elite in the short to medium term, the fundamental problems remain. Spain must understand that the ‘Catalan question’ is partly a symptom of the post-Francoist order of modern Spain; there is a perception of deep-seated ‘Castilian chauvinism’ and ‘sociological Francoism’ within the political cultures and institutions of Madrid, even within the Constitution of Spain. To solve these issues, as well as to answer the ‘Catalan Question’, Spain must reckon with its very foundations and seek a complete overhaul of its outlook to offer substantial material change to all of its citizens, solving the latent alienation felt in Catalonia and other regions. Judicial solutions and constitutional ideals about the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’ (Article 2 of the Constitution) have done little to solve the issues and tensions present in this part of the Iberian Peninsula. However, with the PSOE, married to working within the constitution, PP moving further to the right, and the rise of Vox, it’s questionable whether the will to find novel solutions to create the material changes required to meet the needs of Spain’s minority cultures exists.
As reported in the Guardian, Martí Pont and other independentistas believe that in 2017 they were ‘closer than ever to getting independence, but it was thanks to popular power, not thanks to politicians.’