Cocaine, conflict, and corruption
The recruitment of minors into the ELN (Photo: Braya234, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)
The Colombian landscape in recent years has been torn apart by civil conflict, drug cartels and impermeable, multi-level corruption. As such, the jerky stretches towards a peace resolution are not surprising. Since the early 1980s, the government, right wing paramilitaries and the left-wing guerrilla groups, of which the most famous is Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) made four attempts at a lofty peace deal, with a tentative ceasefire being finally reached in 2016.
La Violencia, as the long running civil war has been christened (though more specifically it refers to the conflict between 1948-57), caused the emergence of FARC and the ELN. The former was considered orthodoxically communist in their approaches, and the latter attracted those more aligned with radical socialism. Throughout the 60s and 70s further guerrilla groups sprouted up around the country. This amplified the instability, particularly as the national army began to act more as an independent force, which subsequently coincided with the arrival of drug cartels and the exploitation of the pre-existing lucrative drug trafficking routes through Colombia’s landscape, with the centres being the cartels of Medellín and Cali.
Cocaine quickly overtook items such as tobacco, liquor, and emeralds as the country’s most sought-after contraband. As the Medellín and Cali cartels grew and assimilated high-ranking Colombians onto their payroll, they soon grew political ambitions of their own. This in turn lead to the creation of paramilitary groups such as Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS – the first and founded in 1981) and United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (UAS).
The 1980s were in fact defined more by political violence, destroying the myth that all Colombian violence is ‘coke-based’. The power of many guerrilla groups waned during this decade, resulting in a small ceasefire and the creation of Unión Patriótica, founded by disbanded FARC members, though, this was seen as little more than FARC’s kick into politics, with members murdered on scales as to justify a ‘political genocide’.
So, the cocaine trade enforced social problems, forcing (quite often indigenous and afro-latinx) people to stay in abject poverty in rural areas of the country. Combined with the political tensions that were greatly impeding the economy (not exactly aided by the drugs trade either), civilians were stuck: FARC’s methods offered kidnapping, links to cartels and extortion, whilst paramilitaries continued their killing sprees with the government turning several blind eyes. If UN involvement in negotiations during the late 1990s did little to facilitate lasting peace, then President Álvaro Uribe’s paramilitary confrontations ten years later caused a nosedive.
However, President Santos’ inauguration in 2010 caused a glimmer of optimism. He stood for modernisation, equality and education, in a landscape where growing opinion agreed that the road away from violence came from dialogue, as opposed to the end of a gun. Consequently, a precious and controversial peace deal with FARC was agreed upon in 2016, with a ‘truth and reconciliation’ process.
Tragically, discontent remains prevalent. Left wing journalists, activists and politicians are still stigmatised due to the conflation with FARC and terrorism, proven by the abuse of peaceful protesters in Cali in 2021. The peace deal itself remains tentative and fragile, and notoriously unpopular, with those on the right claiming it will result in a communist dictatorship and others condemned the act of negotiating with terrorists.
This was made clearer when 50.2% of Colombians voted against this peace deal in a referendum, with the ‘no’ vote campaign had been led by former President Uribe.
The government claims that the peace deal remains after the ‘no’ vote, with FARC leader known as Timochenko confirming that the group is committed. However, alternative guerrilla groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) also remain, and the negotiations between the Colombian government and them (also in 2016) had failed. Paramilitaries also maintain their foothold, despite the 2022 election candidates all receiving death threats.
In an effort to quell the guerrilla violence, President Petro, a former rebel himself, opened up peace negotiations with ELN and as of December 2022, some progress has been made, despite the current lack of a ceasefire.
Crucially, the problem with Colombia is multi-faceted. It is not entirely a case of knocking the first domino down and watching the rest fall into place, but rather an affair akin to the Hydra’s head. Slashing off one may very well lead to an eruption of more. The skyrocketing cocaine trade has proven that quelling violence does not equate to quelling trafficking. Social issues prevail as remaining cartels and paramilitaries make sure that it is more lucrative for those in rural areas to grow coca instead of the state sponsored non-narcotic crops.[11]
Mistrust and bubbling conflict between the left and right both mean that the tensions within this country prevail. The peace agreement also bears close similarities to both the Good Friday Agreement and the Oslo Accords, wherein members of previous terrorist organisations were granted governmental seats. Whilst the situation in Northern Ireland is now far more stable, there were utterances of a breakdown due to the prospect of a hard border post-Brexit, and there remain fierce loyalties to both the Protestant and Catholic causes. To a worse extent in Israel, the Oslo Accords preceded the Second Intifada, the 2014 Gaza War, and seemingly ever-present violence remains within certain areas.
As this model of controlling civil conflict has not exactly been fruitful given these examples, the lack of optimism present in the Colombian population (as shown by the narrow ‘no’ vote, and even the low turnout in the voting booths) is to be expected. There are people who will have lost loved ones in the crossfire; been kidnapped by paramilitaries; murdered by guerrillas; or forced into a drugs trade. Anger is inevitable.
As ever, politicians maintain their optimism, and whilst this opening of new talks with ELN does demonstrate some movement in the right direction, we have to consider what further impacts this next step would have: Colombia’s problems are a tangled web, but that does not necessarily mean that they are all linked. President Petro’s vow of peace is admirable and the movement away from Uribe’s more confrontational approach to negotiations and democratic voting could level the political tensions more successfully.
But, in reality, can political opinion truly be severed from public memory? If we keep the examples of Northern Ireland and Israel – the answer is only: “ish”. Some form of reparations would make most sense logically but that comes with the risk of further resentment, combined with both sides having to pay reparations to each other.
Two steps forward and one step back is still a step forward, and I believe this needs to be the key perspective over the Colombian peace process. The wounds wrenched through Colombia will not fade quickly, and the scars will remain for many years to come. But the first stitches are usually the ones that sting the most.
In a sense, the lack of external involvement in Colombia could be seen as a luxury, it will after all mean that peace happens on their own terms. However, even with the mediation and sponsorship from Norway and Mexico, the tangled web proves difficult to navigate. Negotiations are the clearest way forward, but the road itself has hardly been cleared.