India is breaking up with Russia. Will they ever get back together?

Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi meeting in Sochi, Russia in May 2018 (Photo: Presidential Press and Information Office, CC BY 4.0 International, via Wikimedia Commons)

On the international stage, India is somewhat of an outlier. It has good relationships with both Washington and Moscow and in recent years it has traversed this tightrope skilfully, acting selectively on Russian and American requests to realise its own goals. India has been drifting westwards, inch by inch, for most of the 21st century. Through it all, Russia still remained one of India’s most valued strategic partners. Until March 2022.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a significant development in Russo-Indian relations. Some say that the relationship is simply momentarily frozen. Some imagine the two nations’ diplomats to laugh in the future and exclaim, as Ross from Friends would say: ‘we were on a break!’. In reality, the relationship is not just frozen, but it’s dying. And it’s dying fast.

A quick history lesson. India’s positive relationship with the USSR was sparked by Jawaharlal Nehru’s 1955 visit to the Soviet Union. In this period, India maintained a generally neutral foreign policy; it was a founding organiser of the Non-Aligned Movement which aimed to combat the increasing polarisation of the world into two camps: pro-Soviet and pro-American.

However, Pakistan’s growing closeness with the United States drove India into the hands of the USSR. Both sides developed extensive military, scientific, and educational links. From 2016 to 2020, Russia accounted for 49% of Indian arms imports.

However, India has worked in recent years to develop an indigenous arms industry whilst simultaneously developing closer links with the United States. In 2022, though India welcomed Russia’s foreign minister in April, Prime Minister Modi welcomed Boris Johnson to India and attended the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) summit in Japan – a partnership of Australia, India, the US, and Japan. India’s rhetoric against Russia has hardened in recent days, too.

The South Asian nation’s policy of neutrality came under fire again upon Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As other nations severed their ties with Moscow, New Delhi boosted oil and gas imports and abstained from important votes at the United Nations. At first glance, it seemed as though the relationship was holding strong. After all, between March and July, Russia went from exporting almost no oil to India in January 2022 to exporting almost 1 million barrels per day by June. India was, in turn, softening the impact of sanctions against Russia designed to cripple its economy and force its withdrawal from Ukraine.

This was essentially an act of financial opportunism. Mitigating against rising inflation caused by the impact of the war in Ukraine on retail prices, as well as the long-term impacts of the pandemic, New Delhi capitalised on cheap oil to keep its own economy under control.

That is not to say that this act is justifiable – no doubt, Indian import of Russian oil has sustained Vladimir Putin’s regime and allowed greater pain to be inflicted on Ukrainian people. However, Indian officials have also pointed to the EU’s reliance on Russian gas to deflect criticism on this matter. As the price of crude oil is now falling, India has begun to return to its traditional providers in the Middle East and Africa.

Of course, you could look at India’s votes on United Nations resolutions concerning the invasion of Ukraine as evidence of India’s willingness to stay close to Russia. The south Asian nation has, thus far, refused to side against Russia in any United Nations assembly vote concerning the invasion of Ukraine. India’s silence in this regard is disappointing, to say the least. However, this is not proof of any improvement in the two nations’ relationship.

Rather, the invasion of Ukraine has hastened the demise of the Indo-Russian relationship. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s summit in Uzbekistan, Modi publicly rebuked Putin as a joint press conference:

‘I know that today’s era is not an era of war […] we’ve spoken to you many times on the phone before on this, that democracy, diplomacy and dialogue – these things help the world.’

So, what does this mean for the world? Essentially: more risk, more polarisation, more danger.

Now that the rivalry between the US and the USSR (and its largest successor state, Russia) has now been replaced with an increasingly vitriolic feud between the US and China, the value of India’s diplomatic tightrope performance no longer exists.

Its relationship with its north-eastern neighbour is much worse than that with Russia and the nation runs the risk of becoming China’s main neighbouring foe and falling into the hands of Washington’s Secretary of State.

This risk is compounded by reestablishment of the QSD in 2017, which China has repeatedly denounced as an ‘Asian NATO’. The resurrection of this group not only represents a shift in US foreign policy - in that now “looks east” just that bit more - but it also represents the isolationist tactics being used to corner China through strategic partnerships.

In light of this, India ought to ensure any shifts in its foreign policy remain measured and balanced. While its relationship with Russia may be dying, it would be prudent for it to remain astutely distant and wary of other nations’ motives. As nation home to the world’s sixth largest economy – averaging an annual growth rate over 5% for over a decade (apart from in 2019 and 2020, essentially due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic) – and the world’s second largest population, India would do well to chart an independent course into the future.

Further, without emulating the same democratic sliding visible in Turkey, Indian politicians could learn from Erdogan’s role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Erdogan has managed to become a trustworthy third party between Ukraine and its allies and Russia, securing the landmark grain export agreement in June 2022, allowing nations around the world to restabilise their food provision.

India can – and should – play a mediating role in the numerous internecine conflicts that define the diplomatic chaos of the world’s most populated continent. However, this will only be achieved through the active will and efforts of Indian politicians in playing the long-game and securing India’s respectability on the international stage.