Out of Steam: Is The ‘Franco-German Engine’ Beginning to Sputter?
Strasbourg Gare Tram (Photo: Echtner, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED, via Wikimedia Commons)
It’s hard to find a more consequential pairing in the post-war European order than that of France and Germany. Bitter rivals since Germany’s inception in 1871 - at the Palace of Versailles, no less, in a move no doubt designed to humiliate the French - and arguably long before that, the two nations have become increasingly intertwined in what might at first seem like an unlikely partnership. Where that partnership heads next, though, now seems more uncertain than it has in quite a while.
France and then-West Germany’s overtures towards economic integration with one another were first made in 1950, only six years after France had been occupied by its eastern neighbour. With Europe’s economy in dire straits, it would be coal and steel which would bring lasting peace: the European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC) would be formed, bringing about a mutual economic dependency which would prevent the horrors of the Second World War from being repeated. Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, was tasked with announcing the plans. He chose, with clear symbolism, to do so on 9 May 1950, five years and a day after Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender to the Allied forces. “The coming together of the countries of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. [...] The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible,” Schuman declared. Along with the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg, France and West Germany had charted their economic and political path for the next half-century: the countries would become economically, and thus politically, interlinked.
Schuman’s aim of an integrated, peaceful Europe was bold, and it was largely achieved: soon the ECSC expanded in scope and ambition, becoming the European Community and ultimately the European Union we know today. Despite challenges such as the reunification of Germany in the 1990s and France’s strong streak of protectionism, the “Franco-German engine”, as it came to be known, persisted into the twenty-first century. In 2017, in another highly symbolic gesture, a tram line running between the French city of Strasbourg and the German town of Kehl was constructed, further dissolving the countries’ already open Schengen border .
Despite this achievement, it was clear that trouble was beginning to brew. 2017 was an election year for both France and Germany, and highly nationalist, far-right parties were on the rise. In France, Marine Le Pen, far-right presidential candidate for the Rassemblement National, reached the presidential run-off stage against Emmanuel Macron while advocating for a “Frexit”. Germany’s federal elections, meanwhile, saw the equally extreme Alternative für Deutschland party explode in popularity, going from zero seats in the Bundestag to being the third-largest grouping on 94 seats. Peter Altmaier, the then-German chancellor Angela Merkel’s chief of staff, visited the Strasbourg-Kehl tram line on its opening day in the heat of elections, emphasising that France and Germany had to “continue working together for Europe”. The case for Franco-German integration was having to be made all over again, at a time when the United Kingdom was messily exiting the European framework and scepticism of European institutions was rising. The situation was complicated further still in 2022, when Germany’s reliance on Russian gas saw its energy prices soar due to the Ukraine war. France, though more energy-secure due to its greater reliance on nuclear energy as opposed to gas, saw significant price increases too - something critics were quick to blame on France and Germany’s integrated economies.
2024 was the year of elections, and while no national election had been planned for France, Macron decided to call one anyway following poor European election results. The second-round results that emerged on July 7th have plunged France into a period of instability, with no one party or party grouping commanding a majority. His predecessor having lasted a mere 90 days, the country’s current Prime Minister, François Bayrou, is considering all options in an effort to cobble together a budget. There are signals that the centrist Bayrou may revisit Macron’s controversial pension reform legislation, which saw the age at which French citizens were eligible for a state pension rise from 62 to 64. Such a move would majorly increase France’s sovereign debt, which already stands at a rate far above what is permitted by EU rules. Germany, long considered the standard bearer of fiscal responsibility in the EU bloc, will find itself coming up against this financial reality as 2025 progresses.
In the immediate term, though, Germany’s primary focus will be internal. The so-called Ampelkoalition of Olaf Scholz’s SPD, the centrist, free-market oriented FDP and the Greens collapsed in December following Scholz’s sacking of his FDP-affiliated finance minister Christian Lindner a month earlier. Federal elections are to be held this month on 23 February. While the centre-right CDU are expected to come out on top, significant gains are expected for the far-right AfD, who have pledged to quit the Euro, resume buying Russian gas, and close Germany’s borders. How would the Strasbourg-Kehl tram work then?
All the while, in France, Marine Le Pen of France’s far-right Rassemblement National waits in the wings. The current president of France, Emmanuel Macron, is highly unpopular with French voters, and it is unlikely Le Pen will be blamed for the current instability in the French legislature. Come the presidential elections in 2027, Le Pen has what might be her best shot at seizing power. In a few years’ time, the pro-European, centrist Franco-German engine which has powered the European project for the last sixty years could look very different indeed, influenced heavily by Eurosceptic, right-wing forces which have been shaping the political weather for some time.
All that remains now is to wait and see. What is difficult to argue at this point in 2025 is that anything, to use Schuman’s terms, is truly now “unthinkable”.